Probably my biggest pet peeve in ethical discussions is the classic "don't force your beliefs on other people" line and all of its varients, without any indication that the speaker of the line realizes he is forcing a belief when he says that.
In past usually when a moment like this would occur I would try to point out the contradiction. And usually tempers would flare, and they would refuse to try to defend their position.
The problem came when I find myself wanting to appeal to the line I so thoroughly loathed, yet I could not be intellectually honest with myself and use it. So I sought a way to be able to use the idea and be consistent.
Now, when studying some work on problems facing the philosophy of mathematics in the early 20th century, I reread the problem they faced with predication
, particularly the problems with the idea of impredicability. Basically, if you say something is impredicatable, you have predicated it, and thus you have a contradiction.
The solution came with the theory of types, and that there are types of predication. And thus in a given level impredicatability can be applied without any problems to lower type of predication.
How does this apply to ethics?
Make standard ethical systems a set of one type. And make the claim "Don't force ehtical beliefs" an ethical view of a higher type. So, the contradiction ceases to be.
That sound reasonable?